

**BEFORE THE NEBRASKA TAX EQUALIZATION
AND REVIEW COMMISSION**

DONNA M. KOZAK, TRUSTEE,)
SHOMABAR FOUNDATION,)
)
Appellant,)
)
v.)
)
SARPY COUNTY BOARD OF)
EQUALIZATION,)
)
Appellee.)

Case No. 07E-008

**DECISION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE SARPY COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION**

The above-captioned case was called for a hearing on the merits of an appeal by Donna M. Kozak, Trustee, Shomabar Foundation ("the Taxpayer") to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission ("the Commission"). The hearing was held in the Commission's Hearing Room on the sixth floor of the Nebraska State Office Building in the City of Lincoln, Lancaster County, Nebraska, on September 5, 2008, pursuant to an Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued June 26, 2008. Commissioners Wickersham, Salmon, and Hotz were present. Commissioner Wickersham was the presiding hearing officer. Commissioner Warnes was excused from participation by the presiding hearing officer. The appeal was heard by a panel of three commissioners pursuant to 442 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 4, §11 (10/07).

Donna M. Kozak, Trustee of Shomabar Foundation, was present at the hearing without legal counsel.

Michael A. Smith, a Deputy County Attorney for Sarpy County, Nebraska, was present as legal counsel for the Sarpy County Board of Equalization ("the County Board").

The Commission took statutory notice, received exhibits and heard testimony.

The Commission is required to state its final decision and order concerning an appeal, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the record or in writing. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Cum. Supp. 2006). The final decision and order of the Commission in this case is as follows.

I. ISSUES

The Taxpayer has asserted that the subject property should be exempt from taxation. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board denying an application for exemption of the subject property from taxation is unreasonable or arbitrary; and

Whether the subject property is used exclusively for charitable purposes and exempt from taxation.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Commission finds and determines that:

1. The Taxpayer has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the above captioned appeal to maintain the appeal.
2. The parcel of real property to which this appeal pertains ("the Subject Property") Lot 220 Park View heights 2nd Addition, La Vista, Sarpy County, Nebraska.
3. An application for exemption of the subject property from taxation was filed by the Taxpayer.
4. The Assessor recommended disapproval.

5. The Assessor's recommendation was affirmed by the County Board.
6. The Tax Commissioner was served with a Notice in Lieu of Summons and did not exercise the statutory right to intervene.
7. An appeal of the County Board's decision was filed with the Commission.
8. The County Board was served with a Notice in Lieu of Summons and duly answered that Notice.
9. An Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued on June 26, 2008, set a hearing of the appeal for September 5, 2008, at 9:00 a.m. CDST.
10. An Affidavit of Service which appears in the records of the Commission establishes that a copy of the Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing was served on all parties.
11. The parties stipulated that the only issue in the proceeding was whether the Taxpayer used the subject property for a charitable use as required by Neb. Rev. Stat §77-202(d) (Cum. Supp 2006).

III. APPLICABLE LAW

1. Subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission in this appeal is over issues raised during the county board of equalization proceedings. *Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. Sarpy County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 655, 584 N.W.2d 353 (1998).
2. “Notwithstanding Article I, section 16, Article III, section 18, or Article VIII, section 1 or 4, of this Constitution or any other provision of this Constitution to the contrary: (1) The property of the state and its governmental subdivisions shall constitute a separate class of property and shall be exempt from taxation to the extent such property is used by the state

or governmental subdivision for public purposes authorized to the state or governmental subdivision by this Constitution or the Legislature. To the extent such property is not used for the authorized public purposes, the Legislature may classify such property, exempt such classes, and impose or authorize some or all of such property to be subject to property taxes or payments in lieu of property taxes except as provided by law; (2) the Legislature by general law may classify and exempt from taxation property owned by and used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies and property owned and used exclusively for educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery purposes, when such property is not owned or used for financial gain or profit to either the owner or user....”

Neb. Const., Art. VIII, § 1

3. Section 1 of Art VIII of Nebraska's Constitution, providing for tax exemption of certain property, is not self-executing, but requires action by the Legislature to carry such constitutional provision into effect. *Indian Hills Comm. Ch. v. County Bd. of Equal.*, 226 Neb. 510, 412 N.W.2d 459 (1987).
4. “(1) The following property shall be exempt from property taxes:...(d) Property owned by educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery organizations, or any organization for the exclusive benefit of any such educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery organization, and used exclusively for educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery purposes, when such property is not (i) owned or used for financial gain or profit to either the owner or user, (ii) used for the sale of alcoholic liquors for more than twenty hours per week, or (iii) owned or used by an organization which discriminates in membership or employment based on race, color, or national origin. For purposes of this subdivision,

educational organization means (A) an institution operated exclusively for the purpose of offering regular courses with systematic instruction in academic, vocational, or technical subjects or assisting students through services relating to the origination, processing, or guarantying of federally reinsured student loans for higher education or (B) a museum or historical society operated exclusively for the benefit and education of the public. For purposes of this subdivision, charitable organization means an organization operated exclusively for the purpose of the mental, social, or physical benefit of the public or an indefinite number of persons....” Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-202 (Cum. Supp 2006).

5. In reference to subsection (1)(d) of Nebraska Statutes section 77-202, exclusive use means the primary or dominant use of property, as opposed to incidental use. *Neb. Unit. Meth. Ch. v. Scotts Bluff Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 243 Neb. 412, 499 N.W.2d 543 (1993).
6. Subsection (1)(d) of Nebraska Statutes section 77-202 contains a two-tier approach to property tax exemption: the first tier involves the nature, character, or status of a property owner, and the second tier concerns the use of the property. *Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
7. To be tax exempt, property must (1) be owned by an organization designated in subsection (1)(d) of Nebraska Statutes section 77-202; (2) be used exclusively for at least one of the purposes specified in subsection (1) (d) of Nebraska Statutes section 77-202; and (3) not be (a) owned or used for financial gain to the property owner or user, (b) used more than 20 hours per week for sale of alcoholic liquors, or (c) owned or used by an organization which discriminates in membership or employment based on race, color, or

- national origin. *Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991)
8. Statutes exempting property from taxation are to be strictly construed, property must come clearly within the statutory provisions granting such exemption, and the burden of proving the right to the exemption is upon the claimant. *United Way v. Douglas Co. Bd. of Equal.*, 215 Neb. 1, 337 N.W.2d 103 (1983).
 9. A liberal and not a harsh or strained construction is to be given to the terms 'educational,' 'religious,' and 'charitable' in order that the true intent of the constitutional and statutory provisions may be realized. The interpretation should always be reasonable. *Young Men's Christian Assn. of City of Lincoln v. Lancaster County*, 106 Neb. 105, 182 N.W. 593 (1921).
 10. The burden of proof is upon one claiming property to be exempt from taxation to establish that its predominant use is for one of the purposes set out in this section. *OEA Senior Citizens, Inc. v. County of Douglas*, 186 Neb. 593, 185 N.W.2d 464 (1971)
Berean Fundamental Church Council, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, 186 Neb. 431, 183 N.W.2d 750 (1971).
 11. Regarding "mental" benefit of the public in subsection (1)(d) of section 77-202 of Nebraska Statutes as one of the requisite purposes of a charitable organization, "mental" means "intellectual," which means, among other things, engaged in creative literary, artistic, or scientific labor. *Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).

12. Relative to a charitable organization, "an indefinite number of persons" in subsection (1)(d) of this section means a group of persons with a common characteristic, that is, a class, uncertain in number and composed from the public at large or a community.
Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
13. "The word "charitable" has been held to mean something more than mere alms-giving or the relief of poverty and distress and it has been given a significance broad enough to include practical enterprises for the good of humanity operated at a moderate cost to those who receive the benefits." *Lincoln Woman's Club*, 178 Neb. 357, 363-64, 133 N.W.2d 455, 460 (1965).
14. A tax exemption for charitable use is allowed because those exemptions "benefit the public generally and the organization performs services which the state is relieved pro tanto from performing." *United Way v. Douglas Co. Bd. of Equal.*, 215 Neb. 1, 3, 337 N.W.2d 103, 105 (1983).
15. Under subsection (1)(d) of section 77-202 of Nebraska Statutes, a property owner's exemption from federal income taxation does not determine whether the owner's property is tax exempt under state law. *Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
16. A presumption exists that the County Board has faithfully performed its duties and has acted on competent evidence. *City of York v. York County Bd. Of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 64 N.W.2d 445 (2003).

17. The presumption in favor of the county board may be classified as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987).
18. The presumption disappears if there is competent evidence to the contrary. *Id.*
19. The order, decision, determination, or action appealed from shall be affirmed unless evidence is adduced establishing that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (8) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
20. Proof that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary must be made by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).
21. "Clear and convincing evidence means and is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved." *Castellano v. Bitkower*, 216 Neb. 806, 812, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1984).
22. A decision is "arbitrary" when it is made in disregard of the facts and circumstances and without some basis which could lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. *Phelps Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Graf*, 258 Neb 810, 606 N.W.2d 736 (2000).
23. A decision is unreasonable only if the evidence presented leaves no room for differences of opinion among reasonable minds. *Pittman v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 258 Neb 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999).

IV. ANALYSIS

The sole issue in this proceeding is whether the subject property, a residence owned by Shomabar Foundation, is used exclusively for charitable purposes. The Taxpayer testified that the only uses of the subject property is as a residence for the trustees of Shomabar Foundation, as a residence on an intermittent basis for a son of the trustees, and as headquarters for the Foundation. The parties stipulated to four of the five factors in order to be exempt from property taxes as required in Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-202. The only factor at issue is whether the property is used exclusively for charitable purposes.

The term “charitable uses” has not been defined by the Nebraska Supreme Court. The Court has however discussed the meaning of the word “charity.” Charity has been held to mean a “concrete, practical objective charity, manifested in things done for the relief of the unfortunate and the alleviation of suffering, or in some work of practical philanthropy, as contrasted with the sentimental or ethical viewpoint.” *Appeal of Scottish Rite Bldg. Co. Scottish Rite Bldg. Co. v. Lancaster County et. al.* 106 Neb. 95, 98, 182 N.W. 574, 575 (1921). In an earlier case the Nebraska Supreme Court had cited decisions in other states defining charity to be something more than mere alms-giving or the relief of poverty and distress, and having given the term a significance broad enough to include practical enterprises for the good of humanity operated at a modest cost to those who receive the benefits. *In Re Young men’s Christian Ass’n Assessment. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of City of Lincoln v. Lancaster County et. al.* , 106 Neb. 105, 182 N.W. 593 (1921). As a further consideration Nebraska’s Supreme Court has recognized that charitable exemptions are granted on the hypothesis that the association or organization seeking

an exemption is of benefit to society, that it promotes the social and moral welfare, and to some extent is bearing burdens that would otherwise be imposed upon the public, to be met by general taxation. *Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Omaha v. Douglas County et. al.* 52 L.R.A. 123, 83 N.W. 924 (1900). That view was cited with approval in *United Way of the Midlands v. Douglas County Board of Equalization*, 215 Neb. 1, 337 N.W.2d 103 (1983).

Charitable use of real property has been found in a variety of contexts. Use as a hospital or assisted living facility has been deemed a charitable use. *In Re St Elizabeth Hospital. St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Lancaster County* 109 Neb. 104, 189 N.W. (1922), *Immanuel, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County*, 222 Neb. 405, 384 N.W.2d 266 (1986), *Bethesda Foundation v. Buffalo County Board of Equalization*, 263 Neb. 454, 640 N.W.2d 398 (2002). Use as a meeting place in furtherance of the charitable purposes of a charitable organization has been deemed a charitable use. See, *Lincoln Woman's Club, v. City of Lincoln*, 178 Neb. 357, 133 N.W.2d 455 (1965). A lease by a charitable organization to other charitable organizations at substantially below market rates has been found to be a charitable use. *United Way v. Douglas Co. Bd. of Equal.*, 215 Neb. 1, 337 N.W.2d 103 (1983). On the other hand property used for a commercial lease has not been deemed exempt. See, *In Re Young Men's Christian Assn Assessment. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of City of Lincoln v. Lancaster County et. al.* , 106 Neb. 105, 182 N.W. 593 (1921). The provision of housing at or near cost has not been deemed a charitable use. See, *Douglas County v. OEA Senior Citizens, Inc.* 172 Neb. 696, 111 N.W.2d 719 (1961), *OEA Senior Citizens, Inc., v. County of Douglas*, 186 Neb. 593, 185 N.W.2d 464 (1971), *Christian Retirement Homes, Inc., v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County*, 186 Neb. 11, 180 N.W.2d 136 (1970), *Pittman v. Sarpy County Board of Equalization*, 258 Neb. 390,

603 N.W.2d 447 (1999), *Ev. Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Buffalo County*, 230 Neb. 135, N.W.2d 502 (1988). *Ev. Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Buffalo County*, 243 Neb. 351, 500 N.W.2d 520 (1993).

The Taxpayer cites the provisions of section 005.03B in chapter 40 of the rules and regulations of the Property Tax Administrator for the proposition that the rule requires the trustees to reside on the subject property and that therefore use of the subject property in compliance with that regulation is a charitable use. Interpretation of the regulation requires an examination of its context. Use of the subject property is one of the factors that may be considered before an application for exemption is granted. 350 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 40, §005.03B (05/07). If a parcel for which a charitable exemption is sought is used as a residence the applicant has the burden of proving that the parcel is used for an exempt purpose. *Id.* An exempt purpose may be shown if the property is used for the convenience of the organization and its members to such a degree that the property is an integral part of the organization and use of the property as a residence is incidental to the use of the property as a part of the organizations' mission. 350 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 40, §005.03B(1) (05/07). The activities of Shomabar Foundation are not in evidence. It is impossible to find that a residential use is incidental to unknown activities or that the subject property is used for the convenience of the organization and its members to such a degree that the property is an integral part of the organization. The Taxpayer has not met its burden of proof.

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal.

2. The Commission has jurisdiction over the parties to this appeal.
3. The Taxpayer has not produced competent evidence that the County Board failed to faithfully perform its official duties and to act on sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions.
4. The Taxpayer has not adduced sufficient, clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board is unreasonable or arbitrary and the decision of the County Board should be affirmed.

**VI.
ORDER**

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The decision of the County Board determining that the subject property is taxable as of the assessment date January 1, 2007, is affirmed.
2. This decision, if no appeal is timely filed, shall be certified to the Sarpy County Treasurer, and the Sarpy County Assessor, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
3. Any request for relief, by any party, which is not specifically provided for by this order is denied.
4. Each party is to bear its own costs in this proceeding.
5. This decision shall only be applicable to tax year 2007.

6. This order is effective for purposes of appeal on September 16, 2008.

Signed and Sealed. September 16, 2008.

Nancy J. Salmon, Commissioner

Robert W. Hotz, Commissioner

SEAL

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEB. REV. STAT. §77-5019 (CUM. SUPP. 2006), OTHER PROVISIONS OF NEBRASKA STATUTES, AND COURT RULES.

I concur in the result.

The Commission is an administrative agency of state government. See, *Creighton St. Joseph Regional Hospital v. Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission*, 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000). As an administrative agency of state government the Commission has only the powers and authority granted to it by statute. *Id.* The Commission is authorized by statute to review appeals from decisions of a county board of equalization, the Tax Commissioner, and the Department of Motor Vehicles. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5007 (Supp. 2007). In general the Commission may only grant relief on appeal if it is shown that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(8) (Supp. 2007).

Nebraska courts have held that the provisions of section 77-5016(8) of the Nebraska Statutes create a presumption that the County Board has faithfully performed its official duties and has acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions. *City of York v. York County Board of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The presumption cited in

York has roots in the early jurisprudence of Nebraska. See, *State v. Savage*, 65 Neb. 714, 91 N.W. 716 (1902) (citing *Dixon Co. v. Halstead*, 23 Neb. 697, 37 N.W. 621 (1888) and *State v. County Board of Dodge Co.* 20 Neb. 595, 31 N.W. 117 (1887)). As early as 1903 Nebraska Statutes provided for review of County Board assessment decisions by the district courts. Laws 1903, c. 73 §124. The statute providing for review did not state a standard for that review. *Id.*

In 1959 the legislature provided a statutory standard for review by the district courts of county board of equalization, assessment decisions. 1959 Neb Laws, LB 55, §3. The statutory standard of review required the district Court to affirm the decision of the county board of equalization unless the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable or the value as established was too low. *Id.* The statutory standard of review was codified in section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1511 (Cum. Supp. 1959). Review of district court decisions made pursuant to section 77-1511 was de novo. *Future Motels, Inc. v. Custer County Board of Equalization*, 252 Neb. 565, 563 N.W.2d 785 (1997). The presumption functioned as a standard of review. See, e.g. *Gamboni v. County of Otoe*, 159 Neb. 417, 67 N.W.2d 492 (1954).

The Tax Equalization and Review Commission was created in 1995. 1995 Neb. Laws, LB 490 §153. Section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes was made applicable to review of county board of equalization assessment decisions by the Commission. *Id.* In 2001 section 77-1511 of Nebraska Statutes was repealed. 2001 Neb. Laws, LB 465, §12. After repeal of section 77-1511 the standard for review to be applied by the Commission in most appeals was stated in section 77-5016 of the Nebraska Statutes. Section 77-5016 requires a finding that the decision being reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary. The basis for that determination is the evidence presented to the Commission in a new record. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (Cum. Supp.

2006). Commission decisions are reviewed for error on the record. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-5019(5) (Cum. Supp. 2006). The statutory basis for Commission review and the review of its decisions is analogous to district courts review of decisions made by administrative agencies. The basis for district court review of decisions made by administrative agencies is de novo on the record. *Tyson Fresh Meats v. State*, 270 Neb. 535, 704 N.W.2d 788 (2005). The decisions of the district court examining the administrative decision are reviewed for error on the record. *Thorson v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs.*, 274 Neb. 322, 740 N.W.2d 27 (2007). The similarities are enough to suggest that the framework for review applied to district court decisions could be made applicable to decisions of the Commission.

Many appeals of decisions made pursuant to section 77-1511 were decided without reference to the statutory standard of review applicable to the district courts. See, e.g. *Grainger Brothers Company v. County Board of Equalization of the County of Lancaster*, 180 Neb. 571, 144 N.W.2d 161 (1966). As noted however review was de novo and the reviewing court was not bound by the standard of review imposed on district court. *Loskill v. Board of Equalization of Adams County*, 186 Neb. 707, 185 N.W.2d 852 (1971). In *Hastings Building Co., v. Board of Equalization of Adams County*, 190 Neb. 63, 206 N.W.2d 338 (1973), the Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that two standards of review existed for the district courts; one statutory, and the other judicial stated as a presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully performed its official duties and acted upon sufficient competent evidence. No attempt was made by the *Hastings* Court to reconcile the two standards of review that were applicable to the district courts.

The possible results from application of the presumption and the statutory standard of review by the Commission are: (1) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (2) the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (3) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is overcome; (4) and finally the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is overcome. The first possibility does not allow a grant of relief, neither standard of review has been met. If the presumption is overcome the statutory standard remains. See, *City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The second possibility does not therefore allow a grant of relief even though the presumption is overcome. The third possibility requires analysis. The presumption and the statutory standard of review are different legal standards, one remaining after the other has been met. See. *City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The burden of proof to overcome the presumption is competent evidence. *City of York*, Supra. Clear and convincing evidence is required to show that a county board of equalization's decision was unreasonable or arbitrary. See, e.g. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002). Competent evidence that the county board of equalization failed to perform its duties or act upon sufficient competent evidence is not always evidence that the county board of equalization acted unreasonably or arbitrarily because the statutory standard of review remains even if the presumption is overcome. *City of York*, Supra. Clear and convincing evidence that a county board of equalization's determination, action, order, or decision was unreasonable or arbitrary, as those terms have been defined, may however overcome the presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully discharged its duties and acted on sufficient competent evidence. In any event the statutory standard has been met and

relief may be granted. Both standards of review are met in the fourth possibility and relief may be granted. Each analyses of the standards of review allowing a grant of relief requires a finding that the statutory standard has been met.

Use of the presumption as a standard of review has been criticized. See, G. Michael Fenner, *About Presumptions in Civil Cases*, 17 *Creighton L. Rev.* 307 (1984). In the view of that author the presumption should be returned to its roots as a burden of proof. *Id.* Nebraska's Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of using two standards of review and classified the presumption in favor of the county board of equalization as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. See, *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987). Use of the *Gordman* analysis allows consideration of both the presumption and the statutory standard of review without the possible conflict or difficulties inherent in the application of two standards of review. The *Gordman* analysis requires the Commission to consider all of the evidence produced in order to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the decision, action, order, or determination being reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary. It is within that framework that I have analyzed the evidence.

Wm R. Wickersham, Commissioner